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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH

NA.TIONAL FINANCE COMp 1-\NY OF PROVO,
Plaintiff and Respondent_,
No.

v.

9618

DALLAS E. DALEY and
FLORA DALEY,
Defendants and Appellants.

BRIEF OF

APPELL~TS

STATEMENT O:F THE NATURE OF THE
CASE
This is an action upon a judgment obtained by
plaintiff in the Ogden City Court, wherein defendants
have interposed the affirmative defense that the prior
judgment is a proYable debt discharged in bankruptcy.
1
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DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Defendants moved the lower court for a judgment
upon the pleadings. The lower court denied defendants'
motion, and defendants have petitioned for intermediate
appeal from said order denying the motion for
judgment on the pleadings. This Honorable Court has
granted the petition for intermediate appeal.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendants seek a reversal as a matter of law of
the order of the luwer court denying their motion for
judgment on the pleadings.

STATElVIENT OF FACTS
On May 29, 1958, defendants made a loan from
plaintiff, a loan company, in the sum of $577.69, delivering a promissory note as evidence of the indebtedness.
On January 7, 1959, a judgment was obtained by plaintiff, and against defendants, in the Ogden City Court,
upon a complaint alleging a cause of action upon said
note.
Subsequently, on May 23, 1959, both defendants
filed in the United States District Court for the District of Utah, their voluntary petitions in bankruptcy,
and were duly adjudicated bankrupts. The schedule
of liabilities, filed with each petition, set forth the obligation to the plaintiff, and notice was given in accord2
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ance with law. On Deeember 28, 1959, defendant Flora
Daley was granted her discharge in bankruptcy, and
on 1~-,ebruary 8, 1960, defendant Dallas E. Daley was
granted his discharge in bankruptcy.
Thereafter, on February 17, 1961, plaintiff filed
the instant action upon its judgment obtained in the
Ogden City Court. The cotnplaint is based solely upon
the judgment, making no reference whatsoever to fraud
or misrepresentation. Defendants answered denying
the judgment, and setting up as an affirmative defense
their discharge as bankrupts, avering that the judg·
ments, in any event, would be a provable and discharge•
able obligation by virtue of the Acts of Congress relat-·
ing to bankruptcy.
By way of a pleading entitled "Reply," plaintiff
asserts that defendant borrowed money from the plaintiff, and that the san1e was obtained fraudulently. It
is further asserted that the judgment, the gravamen of
the present action, was based upon the promissory note
given plaintiff at the time of the loan.
Fraud was not the basis of the original action in the
Ogden City Court, nor is it the basis of the instant
complaint.

ARGUMENT
DEFENDANTS ARE ENTITLED, AS A
)lATTER OF LA\V, TO JUDGMENT ON THE
3
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PLEADINGS, INASMUCH AS THE JUDGMENT FORMING THE BASIS OF PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT IS A DISCHARGEABLE OBLIGATION BY VIRTUE OF THE
BANKUPTCY ACT.
A. PLAINTIFF IS PRECLUDED FROM
INTRODUCING EVIDENCE OF
FRAUD WHERE ACTION BASED ON
PRIOR .JlJDGMENT, AND WHERE
PRIOR PROCEEDINGS DEVOID OF
PROOF TO ESTABLISH THE NONDISCHARGEABLE CHARACTER OF
TilE OBLIGATION.
Section I7 of the Acts of Congress relating to
bankruptcy, provides that a discharge in bankruptcy
will release a bankrupt from all of his provable debts,
except such as "are liabilities for obtaining money or
property by false pretenses or false representations, or
for obtaining money or property on credit or obtaining
an extension or renewal of credit in reliance upon a
materially false state1nent in ·writing respecting his
financial condition made or published or caused to be
made or published in any manner whatsoever with intent to deceive,***" (II U.S.C. § 36). The foregoing
incorporates into the Act by amend1nent (Pub. L. No.
86-62I, 86th Cong., 2nd Sess. (July I2, I960), 74 Stat.
408) the result previously reached by case law. Whether
plaintiff can bring this doctrine to bear upon defendants depends upon the genesis of the action.
4
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This case znust not be confused with those where
the plaintiff commences an action upon the promissory
note, or even upon the alleged fraud, and proceeds in
the trial of the matter, in the first instance to offer
competent evidence of fraud. There is no allegation or
evidence of fraud apparent in the first action which
produced the judgment, nor do we have any allegation
of fraud, nor can any properly be made, in the present
action on the judgment. The original judgment, assuming that the entire record of those proceedings can be
inspected, shows that the action ·was brought by plaintiff upon a promissory note, and that judgment was
taken upon the pron1issory note. Neither the action,
proceedings, pleadings, proof or judgment make reference to any fraud or misrepresentation such as would
establish the nondischargeable character of the obligation. This fact is uncontroverted and must be in
mind when the authorities are examined.
It can be agreed that the transformation of a nondischargeable obligation into a note or judgment does
not thereby render the obligation dischargeable in bankruptcy, and it is agreed that the court may look through
the new form of indebtedness and reveal its true character, where that is the fact. Cases supporting this proposition are distinguishable from the instant case in that
only one step intervened between the original debt,
claimed to be nondischargeable, and the effect of the
discharge, that step being the giving of the note in
satisfaction of the obligation, or the obtaining of a
judgment to enforce the debt.
5
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Two steps intervene in the instant case. We not
only have a promissory note given by the defendants,
but in addition we have a judgment on the note. Indeed,
it can be stated that a third step is involved, as plaintiff
is here endeavoring, not to enforce his judgment, but
to bring a wholly new action on the former judgment.
Even assuming that the court could look behind a judgment, standing alone, or behind a note, standing alone,
plaintiff asks that this court look behind the judgment
and then behind the note. Whether the court can now
examine evidence having no relation to the judgment
and not properly raised by the pleadings in either
action is the only issue presented here. .
Although there is some sparse authority to the
contrary, the overwhelming number of courts and responsible authorities have concluded that the nondischargeable character of the original obligation may be
shown only if the record of the judgment or the proceedings in which it was obtained discloses its nondischargeability, but not otherwise. This view is supported
by cases collected in an annotation at 170 A.L.R. 368,
at 37 4, which summarizes the dominant view to conclude
that the nondischargeable character of the original
obligation may be shown only by what appears on the
judgment record or the record of the proceedings culminating in the judgment; so that, if nothing appears
on the judgment record or the record of the proceedings
which would establish the nondischargeability asserted
by the plaintiff, then the judgn1ent will be discharged.
6
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This rationale is supported by the most respected
authority on bankruptcy, Collier, who observes in Collier
iJankruptcy Manual, Second Edition, at page 208, as
follows:
"Of course, if the judgment is based on a record which contains no evidence of false representations, it should be dischargeable. (Citing
cases.)"
Fuller treatment of the problem in Collier on
Bankruptcy~ 14th Edition, Vol. 1, p. 1623, deals with
our precise Issue :
"'Vhere, however, a liability has been prosecuted to judgment, the record is decisive as to
the character of the claim upon which the judgment is founded, and cannot be affected by the
introduction of parol evidence except in the case
of ambiguity. (Citing cases). In order that a
judgment based upon a fraudulent representation may be excepted from the operation of a
discharge, the record in the action must show
fraud and deceit were the 'gist and gravamen'
of the action. (Citing cases) ".
Again, this generally accepted proposition governing the instant case finds support in 6 Am. Jur.~ Bankn.tptcy, § 816, page 1031, which makes the following
conclusion:
"It appears that the majority of the cases
adopt the view that the nondischargeable character of the original obligation may be shown notwithstanding the recovery of a judgment on the
note which evidenced the original obligation, by
resort to the record of the judgment or of the
proceedings in which it was obtained. By the
7
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weight of authority, although it is permitted to
go behind the judgment for the purpose of ascertaining the character of the original obligation, the scope of the showing in this respect is
restricted to the record of the judgment or of
the proceedings in which it was obtained. If
nothing appears on that record showing that the
original obligation was of a character excepted
from the discharge in bankruptcy, the judgment
is dischargeable, and~ conversely, if that record
discloses the nondischargeable character of the
original obligation, the judgment will not be
discharged."
To the same effect, see also 8 C.J.S._, Bankruptcy_,§ 587,
as follows:
"Where the claim or demand against which a
discharge in bankruptcy is asserted is in the form
of a judgment and the issue involved is whether
the judgment comes within a class excepted from
the operation of the discharge, the entire record
of the action in which such judgment was recovered is admissible and may be considered in
the determination of the question, especially if
the nature of the cause in which the judgment
was obtained is not apparent from the judgment
itself. Beyond such record the court may not go,
evidence outside the record not being admissible,
certainly not to contradict the record. This rule
confining the evidence to the record is applicable
where fraud in the incurrin,g of the indebtedness
is asserted to sa·oe the judgment from the discharge.n (Emphasis supplied.)
At page 1522, in 8 C.J.S., it is observed:
"Where it does not appear from the judgment
itself just what the nature of the action was,
8
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whether it was obtained in an action for fraud
such as will bring it within the exception herein
will be determined from an inspection of the
entire record on which the judgment was based.
Beyond the record, however, the court may not
go; hence, where the judgment recites that the
cause of action was based on an account, the
judgment creditor cannot go beyond the judgment and prove that the transaction out of which
it arose was fraudulent, so as to avoid the effect
of a discharge."
The foregoing encyclopedic and text references
are uniform in their analysis of the prevailing reasoning,
and will not permit plaintiff, in the case at bar, to now
open the litigation far beyond the original judgment,
and even beyond the note itself.
In a recent Ohio decision in proceedings to enforce
a judgment taken on a promissory note, the record
being silent as to the facts and circumstances under
which the indebtedness was created, and a defense of
bankruptcy being raised, it was held that evidence
outside of the record is inadmissible to show that the
judgment debtor's obligation is one that is excepted
from the operation of a discharge in bankruptcy
(United Mercantile Agencies v. Williams, 87 Ohio
App. 273, 94 N.E. 2d 572). The distinction between
the situation where the proceedings leading to the judgment are absolutely devoid of evidence tending to sho'v
nondischargeability and the situation where the earlier
proceedings do contain such evidence is well articulated
in Rice v. Guider (1936) 27.5 Mich. 14, 265 N.W. 777,
9
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and a subsequent Michigan decision, Citizens Mutual
.Auto Ins. Co. v. Gardner (1946) 315 Mich. 689, 24
N.W. 2d 410. In the Rice case, supra, the court observed:
"A judgment is but an adjudication upon a
record. Plaintiff could go back of the judgment
but not back of the record. The judgment record
does not bring plaintiff's cause of action within
any exception to the discharge in bankruptcy."
The Insurance Company case, supra~ distinguished the
Rice case in arriving at a different result upon the
ground that the record of the proceedings leading to
the judgment disclosed actual facts establishing the
nondischargeable character of the debt. To the sarne
effect, see Ohio Finance Co. v. Greene~ (Ohio, 1956),
146 N.E. 2d 739; and, Jacobs v. Beatty~ 165 Ohio St.
596, 138 N.E~ 2d 657.
The facts in the present case are identical in all
material respects to those in Bronx County Trust Co.
v. Cassin (1939) 170 Misc. 962, 10 N.Y.S. 2d 986,
where the court was asked to look beyond the pleadings
and into the circumstances of the transaction to find
grounds opposed to the discharge in bankruptcy. In
refusing to do this, the court concluded upon grounds
of practicability and the weight of authority that it
should not attempt to determine whether the transaction involved a different claim from that of the cause
of action which resulted in the judgment.
And, in a case where the enforcement of a judgment upon a note was sought against the bankrupt,
10
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and the complaint in that suit showed no allegation of
fraud whatever, but that the cause of action was entirely one for debt on the note, and the judgment so
refiected, it was held that the bankrupt was entitled to
enjoin the enforcement of the judgment, and the judgInent creditor was precluded frmn offering extraneous
evidence of fraud (Scott v. Corn (1929, Tex. Civ.
App.) 19 S.W. 2~ 412, certiorari denied in 281 U.S.
736, 74 L.ed. 1151, 50 S. Ct., 249).

B. TO PERMIT PLAINTIFF TO INTROD U C E EXTRANEOUS EVIDENCE
NOT RELATED TO THE PLEADINGS
IN EITHER PROCEEDING WOULD
DEFEAT TI-IE PURPOSE OF THE
BANKRUPTCY ACT AND CAUSE DEFENDANTS UNRE.i\SONABLE HARASSMENT.
The rule has a sound social and legal basis. To
pern1it creditors the dubious privilege of reopening
their judgments against a bankrupt to offer extraneous
and foreign evidence having no relationship or bearing
to the cause of action, an election already made, would
frustrate and defeat the purposes of the bankruptcy
act. Carried to its logical extreme, the position urged
by plaintiff conceivably could compel the bankrupt to
relitigate and re-defend countless varieties of actions,
all of which ordinarily are dischargeable. It is submitted
that to do so is inconsistent with the orderly conduct
of legal proceedings, and certainly is not consonant with
11
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the relief afforded by the Bankruptcy Act, which is
intended to relieve the debtor from the constant worry
and pressure of creditors. (See Re Rhutassel ( 1899,
D.C.) 96 Fed. 597).
Illuminating on this aspect of the problem is In
Re Forgay (U.S. Dist. Ct. Utah, 1956) 140 F. Supp.
473, where the United States District Court for the
District of Utah, enjoined a judgment creditor from
executing upon his judgment against a discharged
bankrupt. In that case, a default judgment was obtained
during the pendency of the bankruptcy proceedings
upon a complaint alleging a promissory note, and an
additional allegation of fraudulent misrepresentation.
Although fraud was averted, the court observed that
the "action is founded upon the debtor,s note, and the
creditor "took a judgment on the note, which included,
interest and attorney fees as provided in the note." In
granting a permanent injunction against the judgment
creditor, who tried to set up the purported evidence
of fraud in the securing of the loan, the court chided
the loan company which "had personal notice of the
bankruptcy proceedings but entered no appearance,
filed on proof of claim and interposed no objections to
discharge," concluding:
"Misconduct on the part of creditors, if encouraged, portends the disintegration of the
bankruptcy system and its orderly administration. There is no justification for federal courts
to abdicate their authority in state courts, jeopardize the usefulness of the Bankruptcy Act,
12
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pennit the confusion and harassment of the
honest debtor, give advantage to the unscrupulous creditor and contribute to the lack of public
faith in the proceeding itself."
ln affir1ning the Forgay decision, the lOth Circuit Court
of r\.ppeals made the following observations:
"We are dealing here with a finance company
engaged in making small loans to debtors generally in distress when they apply for such loans.
As observed by the Court in In re Caldwell,
D. C., 33 F. Supp. 631, 635, 'If creditors, with
their expert credit men, were as diligent in investigating the responsibility of applicants for
credit and as prudent in bestowing it, as they are
persistent and sometimes oppressive in attempting to collect after the indebtedness has been
incurred, there would be fewer claims of fraud
and atte1npts like this to defeat a discharge in
bankruptcy,' and we might add by bypassing
the bankruptcy court and in going into a nonrecord state court" (240 F2d 18, 20).
The court further stated that although a reference was
made to fraud in the complaint, more was required,
citing Fillmore Comrnercial & Savings Bank v. J(elly~
62 Utah 514, 220 Pac. 1064, 1066, for the following:
" 'It is elementary that fraud must be alleged
by distinctly pleading the facts constituting the
fraud. Mere epithets or conclusions or general
charges * * * are not good unless accompanied
with a statement of facts to sustain it * * * . It
is necessary to show not only what the fraud
was, and that injury has been sustained, but also
the connection of the fraud with the alleged

13
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damaged, so that it may appear * * * whether
the one might have resulted directly from the
other.' "
·
See also State Finance Co. v. Murrow (lOth Cir.,
1954), 216 F.2d 676; and In re Danahy~ D.C.N.Y., 45
F. Supp. 758.
In a Utah case treating with a similar aspect of
dischargeability in bankruptcy, the court permitted an
examination behind a divorce judgment to ascertain
the nature of an award relating to alimony (Lyons v.
Lyons (Utah, 1949), 206 P.2d 148. In the Lyons
case it was apparent that the award was ambiguous and
in need of clarification, which is not the situation in the
instant case, as here there is no contention that fraud
was the basis of either action. In the Lyons case the
Utah Supreme Court cited as authority for its ruling
2 Freeman on Judgments~ 5th Ed., 1176, and this
author recognizes the distinction between our situations,
where, at page 1177, he comments:
"But while the form of the action is not controlling in determining whether the case falls
within the exception of the statute, nevertheless
this fact must appear from. the record (citing
Matter of Benoit, 124 App. Div. 142, 108 N.Y.
Supp. 889.) and where the action is on contract
it is not permissible to show the debt had its
inception in fraud."

14
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CONCLUSION
The result sought by defendants in their motion
for judgment on the pleadings is manifestly fair and
in har1nony with the purposes of the Bankruptcy Act.
It cannot go unnoticed that plaintiff has never complained about fraud until an answer is filed to a law
suit commenced long after the bankruptcy cases are
closed. No clai1n of fraud was made in the suit on the
note; none was made in the bankruptcy proceeding;
and, none was made in the instant complaint. To permit
plaintiff to throw in a claim of fraud to support an
action upon a note, and where the damages are bottomed
on contract, would be to grossly distort the litigation
beyond the sensible boundaries furnished by the pleadings, and compel the defendants to defend an action
upon a theory neYer properly presented to the Ogden
City Court or to the Second District Court. Accordingly, the defendants respectfully ask that the action
of the Second District Court denying their motion for
judgment on the pleadings be reversed.
Respectfully submitted,
'i\TILLIAM G. FOWLER
1101 Newhouse Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
..t\.ttorney for Defendants
and Appellants
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